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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
was of his own making and he cannot be heard to com-
plain. Another reason given was that the defendant failed
to show the actual value of the property in question at
the time the agreement was made.
The Court held the measure of damage to be the
difference between the actual value of all that the plaintiff
received and all that he gave. In other words it was the dif-
ference between the actual value and the price paid. This
case does not set forth the represented value as. the meas-
ure of damage. The only reason why the represented
value was used in the trial court is because the defendant
asked for it even though detrimental to him. In laying
down the true measure of damage the court cites the case
of Browning v. Rodman, supra.
2
1
The latest case on this subject 28 holds that in the case
of fraudulent representations in the sale of stock the
measure of damage is the difference between the price paid
and the actual value of the stock. In case the stock had
no value, the amount would be determined by what the
plaintiff had paid for the stock.
In summing up we find the following propositions to
be true as to the measure of damage:-
1. Breach of Warranty-The difference between the
price paid and the value of the goods had the representa-
tions been true.
2. Fraudulent Representations-The difference be-
tween the price paid and the actual value.
Are we to infer that the courts are placing a premium
on fraud when they allow greater damages for breach
of warranty than for fraudulent representations?
Joseph Maimon
RESTORATION OF CONSIDERATION IN IN-
FANTS' DISAFFIRMANCE OF PURCHASE OF PER-
SONAL PROPERTY-Installment selling has become one
of the common features of our every day life. Automobiles,
pianos, victrolas, household furniture, practically all or-
dinary commodities can now be bought on the time-pay-
ment plan. Often these sales are made to minors and these
2TSee Note 23.
28s1oagland v. Mulford, (1930) 148 A. 864; cites with approval-
Curtis v. Buzard, supra; Browning v. Rodman, supra; Long v. Mc-
Allister, supra.
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transactions give rise to perplexing legal problems.
Economists of the old order may rant and rave at the
modern practice of anticipating future income by buying
on installments, but no one can deny that it is a widely
accepted practice and the legal problems arising from it are
coming before the Courts.
We are not concerned herein with infants' contracts
for necessaries for that situation appears to be adequately
covered by Section 2, of the Pa. Sales Act,' and by the
same or corresponding sections in the Uniform Sales Acts
of the various states.
One of the problems, and one which gives rise to widely
divergent views, arises when such a sale has been made to
an infant, and later the infant decides to disaffirm the con-
tract. The question arises as to the necessity for the return
of the chattel, and whether or not the deafer may deduct
the loss in value from the purchase price which the infant
demands be returned to him.
The majority rule is that the infant upon disaffirmanee
must return the consideration (chattel), if he has it, and
the dealer cannot deduct for use of, or depreciation in, the
value of the property.
2
The minority, or so-called New York rule, requires the
infant upon disaffirmance, to account for the depreciation
in the value of the property.3 The United States Supreme
Court has aligned itself with the minority, for in Myers v.
Hurley Motor Co.,' the seller was allowed to recoup for the
use and depreciation of the property. There the minor had
misrepresented his age but the Court refused to make this
fact a limitation upon the application of the doctrine. How-
ever, in the Myers case the seller's recovery was limited to
an abatement of the infant's claim. This is not true under
the New York and California decisions.
An early case in Pennsylvania5 involving elements of
this problem held that restoration or tender back of the
consideration received by the infant was not a condition
11915, P. L. 543.
2Arkansas Reo Motor Car Co. v. Goodlet, 163 Ark. 35, 258 S. W.
975; Houser v. Marmon Chicago Co., 208 Ill. App. 171; Story &
Clark Piano Co. v. Dany, 68 Ind. App. 150; Gillis v. Goodwin, 18&
Mass. 140 and Reynolds v. Garber Buick Co., 183 Mich. 157.
8Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y. 578; Murdock v. Fisher Finance Corp.,
251 Pac. (Cal.) 319.
4273 U. S. 18.
5Shaw v. Boyd, 5 S. & R. 309.
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precedent to recovery by an infant suing to disaffirm the
contract. In a later case6 the Court held that the infant
plaintiff seeking to avoid his executed contract had to
return nothing. Two reasons were given for this holding:
(1) that it was a mere gambling contract and void
ab initio, and
(2) that since the infant had really received nothing
under the contract there was no necessity for re-
turning anything.
But the dictum of Justice Gordon, "This rule (that where
an infant has executed a contract, and has enjoyed the
benefit of it, and afterwards on coming of age seeks to
avoid it, he must restore the consideration) may, and cer-
tainly does apply in certain cases, but as a general rule
it is unsound. Its application was refused in Shaw v. Boyd,
5 S. & R. 309".
From this dictum we gather the impression that the
rule in Shaw v. Boyd, supra, is still unchanged and was the
law in Pennsylvania at that time. A few years later the
Court held that where an infant has misrepresented his age
to the seller, the seller may replevy the goods in the hands
of the infant, or in the hands of a buyer from the infant,
unless he is a purchaser for value without notice of the
misrepresentation of age.7 This was decided upon the
theory that the fraud of the infant made the contract void-
able by the seller. This decision does not overrule Shaw v.
Boyd, supra. Spangler v. Haupt" indicates that while Neff
v. Landis, supra, is the rule where there has been a fraud-
ulent misstatement of age and the minor still has the goods,
yet that decision does not overturn the general rule of Shaw
v. Boyd, supra. In the Spangler case the infant had pur-
chased goods and later sold them to bona fide purchasers.
A few months later, on reaching his majority, he dis-
affirmed the contract of purchase. The Court imposed no
duty upon him to place the adult party in statu quo, and
held, also, that the seller could not maintain an action for
deceit to recover the price.9
A late case in the Superior Court,10 wherein the infant
elected to disaffirm the contract and sued for the value of
his old car, which had been accepted in part payment for
GRuchisky v. DeHaven, 97 Pa. 202.
7Neff v. Landis, 110 Pa. 204.
853 Pa. Super. Ct. 545.
'This case was followed in Kay v. Haupt, 63 Pa. Super. Ct. 16.
10Musser v. Schock, 95 Pa. Super. Ct. 406.
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a new one, held that the infant, in disaffirming in this state,
does all that is required by returning to his seller, or by
tendering to him, the object purchased in whatever condi-
tion it may be at the time of its return or tender; it need
not be in the condition in which it was received from the
seller. To permit a defendant to assert an infant's obli-
gation to restore the property in its original condition,
would, to that extent, be permitting the defendant to en-
force his contract with the infant, which is the very thing
the policy of the law was intended to prevent. This case
necessarily implies that had the infant lost or destroyed the
subject matter of the sale, he would be under no duty to
return it, or place the adult party in statu quo before dis-
affirming and suing to recover the purchase price.
To summarize the rule in Penna.: Shaw v. Boyd, supra,
held that restoration, or tender of the consideration, was
not a condition precedent to recovery by an infant suing to
disaffirm the contract. This rule has not been changed by
any later decision of the Supreme Court and therefor ap-
pears to be the law in Pennsylvania today.
Neff v. Landis, supra, held that when the infant has
misrepresented his age and still retains the goods, they may
be replevied from him on the theory of recission on the
ground of fraud.
Musser v. Schock, supra, impliedly qualifies the rule in
Shaw v. Boyd, supra, to the extent that the infant must re-
turn, or tender, the subject matter, the consideration, in
whatever condition it may be, if he has it, at the time he
disaffirms. This qualification is in line with the general
rule and the weight of authority as stated in 31 C. J. 1073,
Sec. 168--"Restoration or offer to restore does not become
a condition precedent where no duty is imposed on the
infant to return the consideration after disaffirmance of the
contract as where the consideration has been lost, squand-
ered, or wasted".
R. T. Harrigan
